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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action involves a written lease agreement covering 
real property wherein plaintiffs sued defendants-for breach of the 
terms thereof, i.e. non-payment. Defendants denied breach thereof 
and affirmatively alleged multiple defenses and asserted a 
counterclaim against plaintiffs for damages result-rug from 
plaintiff's breach of the Lease Agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court disposed of the action by granting 
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, Dased upon Rule 2.8(e)(f) 
Rules of Practice, Dist. and Circ. Ct., which relate' to summary 
judgment, for the reason that defendants failed ttr object as 
provided by Rule 2.8. Defendants objected to t-he* -^ in'dings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree submitted oy- Plaintiffs 
thereafter and moved that the summary judgment be reversed and/or 
set aside based upon Rules 52, 56, 59, 60 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and the lower court denied allKof defendants1 
motions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the Summary Judgment- entered by 
the District Court and to have the case remanded'for a trial on 
the merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiffs in this case moved the court foi summary 
judgment on their Complaint and defendants Answer & Counterclaim 
on or about the 11th day of January, 1988- On February 8th the 
Court granted plaintiffs1 motion pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the 
Rules of Practice of the Fourth Judicial District Court for the 
reason that the defendants had made no written response to 
plaintiffs1 motion for summary judgment at that time. On the 
24th day of February, pursuant to said Order of the Court 
plaintiffs served upon defendants proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Summary Judgment. On the 28th day of 
February, defendants objected to said Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment, and on the 21st day of 
March the Court overruled defendants' objection and ordered the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Summary Judgment signed 
on March 16, 1988, to be entered by the clerk and on March 22, 
1988, the same was entered Thereafter, on the March 31, 1988, 
defendants moved the District Court to reverse and set aside the 
summary judgment entered and on the 30th day of June, 1988, said 
court denied defendants1 motion and defendants appealed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE DEFENDANT HAD UNTIL FEBRUARY 19, 1988 TO RESPOND TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION AND THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
PREMATURELY GRANTED PLAINTIFFS' MOTIONS ON FEBRUARY 8, 1988 
Rule 2.8(g), Rules of Practice, Dist. & Cir. Ct., states 
that: 
(2) 
In all-cases where the granting of a motion would dispose 
of the action or any issues thereof on the merits with 
prejudice, the party resisting the motion may request a 
hearing and such request shall be granted unless the 
motion is summarily denied. If no such request is made 
within ten (10) days of notice to submit for decision, a 
hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
Rule 6, U.R.C.P., provides as follows: 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time 
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of 
any district court, by order of court, or by any applicable 
statute, the date of the act, event, or default from which 
the designated period of time begins to run shall not be 
included. The last day of the period so computed shall be 
included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of 
the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal 
holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is 
less than seven days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and 
legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation. 
(e) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a 
party has the right or is required to do some act or take 
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the 
service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice 
or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added 
to the prescribed period. 
Plaintiff's request for ruling was mailed to defendants on 
the 3rd day of February, 1988, which was a Wednesday (Record, p. 
239). Pursuant to Rule 6(a)(e) and Rule 2.8(g), supra, the first 
date that the court could have ruled would have been Tuesday, 
February 9, 1988, provided the ruling was not dispositive of the 
action. The court ruled on February 8th, 1988 (Record, p. 241). 
Rule 2.8, however, gives defendants an additional ten (10) days to 
request a hearing in the event that the granting of plaintiffs1 
motion would dispose of the action. Said Rule further provides 
(3) 
that the court shall grant such a request unless it summarily 
denies the dispositive motion. It is obvious in this case, even 
ignoring the extension of time for mailing and weekends, provided 
by Rule 6, that Rule 2.8 would have prohibited the court from 
entering the judgment prior to February 15, 1988. 
POINT II. 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT WERE BEFORE THE COURT AT THE TIME IT 
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In order for the District Court to grant the relief it did 
in this particular case it would have had to strike defendants' 
Answer and Counterclaim, as well as the sworn testimony in the 
depositions of Frank K. Stuart and Carlene Stuart. The 
foregoing pleadings were before the court at the time it granted 
summary judgment, and said depositions created issues which could 
not be resolved without a trial on the merits. (See Record, 
p.161; plaintiffs' motion to publish the depositions of Frank and 
Carlene Stuart dated 12/15/870. See also Record, p.126, lines 
17,22, and p.127, line 1, and p.132, line 8, wherein plaintiffs 
refer to the depositions of Frank K. and Carlene Stuart in its 
Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Defendants' Counterclaim.) Defendants Answers to Plaintiffs' 
Interrogatories and their Reply to Request for Admissions were 
filed on February 26, 1988, simultaneously with defendants' 
objections to plaintiffs' proposed findings of fact and 
(4) 
conclusions of law, which, even though filed after the court's 
original order of February 8, 1988, were filed with the court at 
the time it denied defendants' initial objection and subsequent 
motions. (Record, p.312,254,287.) It is obvious that after 
examining all of the foregoing items, which were before the 
court, that said court ignored them all. It is further obvious 
from the extensive Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
entered by the Court that issues were raised by the material 
before court at the time the initial order of February 8, 1988 
was made. (Record, pp.322-333, entitled Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law; and Record, pp.333-335, entitled Ruling; and 
Record, pp.336-338, entitled Order and Judgment), it is also 
obvious that the District Court ignored all of the pleadings in 
granting the relief that it did. 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure entitled 
"Summary Judgment" provides, among other things, the following: 
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a 
claim, counterclaim or crossclaim . . . . may move with or 
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in 
his favor upon all or any part thereof. (Emp Added) 
56(c) of said Rules, entitled "Motion and Proceedings Thereon" 
provides, among other things, as follows: 
The motion shall be served at least ten days before the 
time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to 
the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, deposi tions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, Lf any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
(5) 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. (Emp* added) 
The inquiry upon review of a summary judgment which should 
be conducted by the trial court is as follows: Are there material 
issues of fact to be litigated; if there are then summary judgment 
is not applicable and the moving party is not entitled to summary 
judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is a preemptory 
remedy and the trial court in determining whether a material 
issue of facts exist for the purpose of applying Rule 56r to-wit: 
summary judgment, must view the facts and their inferences in the 
light most favorable to the party moved against. See Sport v. 
Crested Butte Silver Mining, 740 P2d 1304. 
In Olwell v. Clark, 658 P2d 585, the Court in substance 
said that it is not always required that a party proffer 
affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary judgment in 
order to avoid judgment against him. The Rule states 
specifically that a response in opposition to a motion for 
summary judgment must be supported by affidavits or other 
documents only to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of 
fact for trial. 
Rule 56(e), which relates to affidavits, is not mandatory 
and does not require the opposing party to submit opposing 
affidavits when the same are not necessary. What it requires, 
among other things, is that the court may permit affidavits to be 
(6) 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, or further affidavits. 
In Frisbee v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P2d 387, the 
court in discussing the particular point in question relating to 
56(c) et seq. , Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stated: 
It [summary judgment] should be granted only when it 
clearly appears that there is no reasonable probabilitity 
that a party moved against could prevail. As this court 
explained the standard: 
Summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, 
depositions, affidavits and admissions show that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law. If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, the doubt sh_quld be 
resolved in favor of the opposing party. Thusy the 
court must evaluate all the evidence and aJJL 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary. (Emp added) 
The Court in Frisbee goes on to quote the standard taken 
from Olwell v. Clark, supra, wherein the following was stated: 
Rule 56(e) specifically states that a response in 
opposition to a motion must be supported by affidavits or 
other documents only in order to demonstrate that there 
is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Where the party 
opposed to the motion submits no documents in opposition, 
the moving party may be granted summary judgment only "if 
appropriate", that is if he is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. (Emp. added) 
In this case the plaintiffs own affidavit in support of its 
Motion for Summary Judgment in and of itself raises issues to be 
tried by this court. Said affidavit of plaintiffs is contrary to 
(7) 
most of the pleadings and sworn testimony offered by the 
defendants in this case prior to plaintiffs submitting any 
affidavit. Defendantsf, and other independent witnesses1, answers 
given in depositions taken by plaintiffs are contrary to the 
affidavit submitted by the plaintiffs in support of plaintiffs1 
Motion for Summary Judgment and, as previously indicated, were 
before the Court and used by plaintiffs to support their Motion 
for Summary Judgment when the court granted summary relief, A 
summary review of all of the aforesaid pleadings, 
interrogatories, reply to request for admissions, and depositions, 
which is required by Rule 56, supra, wouJd have indicated that 
there are substantial material issues that should be tried by the 
lower court. 
The Court, in Webster v. Sill, 675 P2d 1170, Utah (1983), 
stated at page 1172s 
As a matter of general evidence law, a deposition is 
generally a more reliable means of ascertaining the truth 
than an affidavit, since a deponent is subject to 
cross-examination and an affiant is not. See also 6 J. 
Moore, W. Taggart and J. Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice 
§56,11(4) at 56-277 (1983). (Emp. added) 
In Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, Utah (1984) the Court 
stated as follows: 
A motion for summary judgment can only be granted when 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and 
"even assuming the facts as asseted by the party moved 
against to be true, could not prevail". This Court has 
also stated: 
Since the party moved against is denied the 
(8) 
opportunity of presenting his evidence and his 
contentions, it is and should be the policy of the 
courts to act on such motions with great caution, to 
assure that a party whose cause might have merit is 
not deprived of the right to access to the courts for 
the enforcement of rights or the redress of wrongs. 
(Emp. added) 
In Callioux v. Progressive Insurance Co., 745 P2d 838 
(Utah App. 1987) the court stated at page 840 that: 
We review the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the . . ., the parties to whom the judgment 
was granted. . . Summary judgment should be granted only 
when it is clear from the undisputed facts that the 
opposing party cannot prevail. . . Generally, summary 
judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete 
since information sought in discovery may create genuine 
issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion. 
(Emp. added) 
In this particular case there has been substantial 
discovery completed as indicated heretofore herein, but defendants 
have not as yet deposed the plaintiffs and had advised counsel 
for plaintiffs that they intended to do so prior to the filing of 
this summary judgment. Thus, unless plaintiffs herein have filed 
their Notice of Readiness for Trial and certified to the court 
that all discovery is complete the defendants may still proceed 
with discovery and intend to do so. 
In Rich v. McGovern, 551 P2d 1266 (1976), the Supreme Court 
summarized the duties of the court with regard to a motion for 
summary judgment. At page 1267 sajd court stated: 
The purpose of the motion for summary judgment is to 
provide a means for searching out the undisputed facts as 
shown by the "submissionsM to the court, i.e., the 
pleadings, depositions, admissions and answers to 
(9) 
interrogatories and documents; and if on that basis the 
controversy can be settled as a matter of ibavr,—fefrat will-
save the time, trouble and expense of a triaL. However 
inasmuch as the party moved against is being defeated 
without the privilege of a trial, the court should 
carefully scrutinize the "submissions" and contentions he 
makes thereon to see if his contentions and proposals as 
to proof of material facis, if resolved in his favoru 
would entitle him to prevail; and if it so appears, the 
motion for summary judgment should be denied and a trial 
should be had for the purpose of resolving the disputed 
issues of fact and determining the rights of the parties. 
(Emp. added) 
It appears from the court's memorandum decision (Record, 
p.336, 400, 407) that unless an objection is made or a 
counter-affidavit is submitted in opposition to plaintiffs1 
motion for summary judgment that the court's duty is to 
automatically grant summary judgment pursuant to Ruie 2.8. It is 
respectfully submitted that this is not the law. Defendants 
believe that the law places more responsibility on the court. It 
is defendants' position that the court, when disposing of an 
action by summary judgment, should consider all of the material 
before it prior to ruling. Defendants, prior to plaintiffs 
filing its Affidavit in Support of its Motion for Summary 
Judgment responded under oath to plaintiffs' questions in two 
depositions, a set of interrogatories and request for admissions. 
Reference is made to paragraph 9 of the affidavit of John 
R. Thackeray filed in support of plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment which states as follows: 
That as a rental payment for said property the defendants 
agreed to pay the s um of $1,500.00 per month, plus 
(10) 
percentage rent, consumer price adjustments, common area 
expenses, late charges, taxes, insurance and sign maintenance 
expenses." (Record, p.163) 
Paragraph 4 of defendants1 Reply to Request for 
Admissions, against given prior to plaintiffs1 affidavit being 
filed, emphatically denys the above quoted portion of plaintiffs1 
affidavit. (Record, p.288). Paragraph 5 of said Reply to Request 
for Admissions also specifically controverts plaintiffs' 
statement in his affidavit. (Record, p.288-289). 
The Court's attention is further directed to the balance of 
the replies given by defendants to plaintiff's Request for 
Admissions, specifically paragraphs 6-34, all of which relate to 
rent payments referred to in plaintiffs' affidavit and all of 
which are emphatically denied by defendant. (Record, p.289-294). 
Obviously, plaintiffs knew when they filed the motion for 
summary judgment that there were issues raised by plaintiffs' own 
affidavit. It is to be noted that the courts have stated the 
summary judgment is to shorten and cut down costs and expense, but 
it only works when the rules are properly applied by those in the 
practice, and if not properly applied then the process is merely 
protracted and made more expensive as in this case. 
Further issues are raised in plaintiffs' affidavit by 
defendants Answers to Plaintiffs' Interrogatories, said answers 
also having been given prior to plaintiffs' affidavit. The courts 
attention is directed to paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19 
(11) 
of said affidavit (Record, p.164-168). Defendant, in answering 
said interrogatories in June, 1987, stated, under oath, facts 
controverting all claims made in plaintiffs' affidavit. (Record, 
p.254-286). 
The court's attention is further directed to defendants 
supplemental answers to plaintiffs' interrogatories, which answers 
were again made prior to the time plaintiffs filed their affidavit 
in support of its motion for summary judgment which, again, 
controvert plaintiffs' affidavit and thereby raises issues to be 
determined by the court. (Record, p.243-253). 
The plaintiffs specifically relied upon the deposition of 
Frank K. Stuart and Carlene Stuart in its memorandum in support 
of its motion for summary judgment (Record, p.125-135), and had 
said depositions published on or about December 15, 1987 
(Record, p.161, Motion to Publish Depositions). Said depositions 
were obviously published by plaintiffs and the above-entitled 
court prior to the time that plaintiffs' affidavit in support of 
his motion for summary judgment was filed, and both of said 
depositions controvert the facts stated in plaintiffs' affidavit, 
and the court should have had access to both depositions at the 
time it ruled on plaintiffs' motion inasmuch as plaintiffs had 
previously published the same. The deposition of Carlene Stuart 
in summary states that there was conversation at some time at or 
about the time the lease was signed that there would not be 
(12) 
another tanning salon within the leased complex. See Carlene 
Stuart's deposition, p.26, lines 10-25, and p.27-29, p. 30, lines 
12-35, p.31, p.32, lines 9-25, p.33, lines 1-25, p.34, lines 1-6, 
all of which relate to breach of and interference with 
contractual rights of the parties when defendants were in 
possession, as does p.40, lines 5-25, and p.41, which relates to 
the reduction of the rent, p.42, lines 1-6, which controverts the 
affidavit as to the date the property was vacated, p.43, lines 
1-9 again relating to the reduction of the rent, p.45, lines 
19-25, and p.46-48, which relate to the allegations made in the 
counterclaim relating to fraudulent inducements made by 
plaintiffs to defendant Frank K. Stuart to induce him to sign the 
lease. Said inducements being that there would be no other 
tanning salon in the complex in question. P.56, lines 1-5, the 
witness talks about reduction of the lease as she does on p.57, 
lines 8-25, wherein she indicates that the rent reduction is to 
continue through the end of the lease. P.59, lines 7-25, 
indicate that there may have been one or two payments due and 
owing, if any, at the time the property was vacated, and at the 
time the property was vacated plaintiffs released defendants from 
any other obligation on the lease. P.79, talks about reduction 
of the lease payments again as well as said reduction being 
retroactive and continuing to the end of the lease, as does p.80. 
Page 82, lines 8-25, reference is again made to the reduction in 
(13) 
rent and the release from said lease, and the offer to re-lease 
the same premises on a month-to-month basis after vacating the 
same. Reference is also made to defendants Answer to Plaintiffs 
Interrogatories regarding the same and is continued on p.83 of 
said deposition, and at p.85, lines 1-20 of said deposition, 
wherein the witness again reiterates her position with regard tc 
the interference with the lease/contract in question. At p.86, 
lines 14-25, the witness talks about her understanding with 
regard to Jean's Nails tanning beds, to-wit: there were to be 
used for nails customers only and not for any other purpose. 
That understanding was gained at or prior to the time the lease 
signed, and said depositon through p.87-92 explains that the 
understanding with regards to Jean's Nails was obtained at or 
prior to the time said lease was signed, but said witness 
indicated that she did not know when said lease was signed so she 
could not really testify to the same. 
In summary, the witness Carlene Stuart in her deposition 
denys the amount due, talks about interference with contract, 
fraud and all of the allegations set forth in defendants1 Answer 
and Counterclaim, all of which controverts under oath plaintiffs 
affidavit in support of summary judgment, and plaintiff Thackeray 
knew, or should have known, at the time he filed his affidavit 
that the statements made therein would raise numerous issues in 
this case because plaintiffs1 counsel took the depositions. 
(14) 
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(15) 
At p.20, lines 8-25, and p.21-24, p.25, lines 1-5, said 
deposition relates to problems encountered with the competing 
tanning salon after the contract was signed, and efforts to 
rectify the problems. This portion of the deposition is part of 
the basis for interference with contract and fraud. Also, said 
pages refer to conversations regarding the reduction of the rent 
and agreement to reduce the same by 25% as indicated by Carlene 
Stuart's deposition. Frank K. Stuart and Carlene Stuart's 
depositions, published prior to the filing of plaintiffs' 
affidavit, and relied upon by both plaintiffs and the court in 
granting plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment created issues 
which should have been obvious to the court and plaintiffs. 
P.33, lines 7-25 of Frank K. Stuart's deposition relates 
to the fraud perpetuated by plaintiffs upon defendants prior to 
the execution of the lease. P.34, lines 15-25, and all of 
p.35-38, p.39, lines 1-5, relate to the losses sustained by 
reason of the interference with the contract during the operation 
of the business and fraud perpetuated on defendants by 
plaintiffs. P.41, lines 16-25, the witness indicates that 
plaintiffs disagree with the amount claimed in the complaint, 
which may or may not be the same as the amounts claimed in 
plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
P.42, lines 7-11 specifically, defendant states that "it 
was my understanding that the rent was to terminate when we moved 
(16) 
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DEFENDANT, PURSUANT TO HULL biy^i, L .  , L . P . , I TIMELY MOTION 
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ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT SAID MOTION 
Rule 59(e) of the I Jtah Rules o'" ! IOS 
I hat I Mi-I i in I M I ». i i Amend a Judgment may be made not. J ater 
(17) 
than ten days after entry of the judgment. In the case of Hume v 
Small Claims Court of Murray City, 590 P2d 309 (Utah 1979), the 
court covered the issue as to whether or not the Motion to Alter 
or Amend a Judgment could properly be used for the purpose of 
setting aside or reversing a judgment. The Court stated at page 
310 as follows: 
[1] The first issue presented is whether petitioner's 
motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) was 
properly taken. 
Rule 59(e) provides: 
A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than ten days after the entry of the 
judgment. 
Defendant argues that this rule cannot be used for the 
purpose of reversing a judgment or rehearing the 
arguments. Defendants' argument is without merit. Under 
Rule 59 a party may move for a new trial upon any of the 
grounds stated therein. 
Subdivision (e) of Rule 59 provides a time limitation for 
this type of motion, which is directed to the Court for 
rehearing of its own judgment. Such motions must be based 
on one or more of the grounds set forth in subdivision 
(a). 
(Emp. added) 
Rule 59(a)(1),(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provide as follows: 
(a)(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, . . 
.or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(a)(7) Error in law. 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on their face 
clearly show evidence that material issues of fact were raised 
(18) 
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In Mountain States, Etc. v Atkin, Wright & Miles, supra, 
the court stated that: 
Litigants must be able to present their cases fully to the 
court before judgment can be rendered against them unless 
it is obvious from the evidence before the court that the 
party opposing judgment can establish no right to 
recovery. 
It appears that the lower court in order to reach the 
conclusion it did, decided that Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice 
of the District Court superseded and abrogated case law holdings 
under Rule 56 U.R.C.P., as well as the case law itself. In any 
event, this seems to be the result reached by said Court. (See 
Rulings, Record, pp.241, 333, 400). 
Rule 2*1 of the Rules of Practice of the District Court 
provides that: 
These rules shall govern the practice and procedure in the 
district courts and circuit courts of the state of ntah in 
all matters not specifically covered by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. (Emp. added) 
The Court in construing Rule 2.8, as it did in this matter, 
appears to have created something more similar to a default 
judgment rather than a summary judgment, and in order to enter 
such a default pursuant to Rule 2.8 the Court would have had to 
give superior credence to Rule 2.8 over Rule 56, which would be 
contrary to Rule 2.1 of Rules of Practice, District Court. 
(20) 
POINT IV. 
THE FURTHERANCE OF JUSTICE REQUIRE THAT THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
(DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS PER RULE 2.8) BE SET ASIDE PURSUANT TO 
RULE60(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OFCIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 60(b), I Jtah Ru I >:s of Civil i * o':edure, previaes, among 
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justice would have been fulf i 1 Led. 
(21) 
The motions and counter-motions in this matter took place 
at a time that each district court within the state could pick and 
choose from the Rules of Practice, Dist. and Circ. Ct. At that 
time the Salt Lake District chose not to apply Rule 2.8, but Utah 
County area did. Other districts from time to time accepted or 
rejected the Rule and confusion among the districts existed. 
Counsel for defendants practices primarily in Salt Lake County 
where is the Rule was not applied, thus because of inadvertance, 
as well as other reasons set forth in defendants1 counsel's 
affidavit, Rule 2.8 overlooked. Obviously, counsel for defendants 
was not the only practitioner somewhat bewildered by the lack of 
uniformity in the application of the rules in question throughout 
the districts. It is respectfully submitted that a substantial 
number of lawyers were also caught in the same situation as 
indicated by a number of recent articles in the Utah Law Journals 
relating to the same, and the final decision to make said rules 
uniform throughout the district as of October 30, 1988. It is 
unfortunate, in the opinion of defendants' counsel, that said Rule 
2.8 was adopted as it is written. It is diametrically opposed to 
the intent and writing of Rule 56, U.R.C.P, supra, as well as the 
case law relating thereto, and if not applied judiciously by the 
varies judges of the district and circuit courts, Rule 2.8 totally 
ignores substance in favor of procedure. 
The Honorable Scott DanieLs, Presiding Judge, Salt Lake 
(22) 
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(23) 
proceeding for the following reasons " (emp added). 
See also Sperry v. Smith, 694 P2d 581 (Utah 1984), where 
the Court set aside a summary judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). 
In the Katz case, supra, the court further stated that when 
deciding whether a default judgment should be set aside, the court 
should balance the equities on a case by case basis, including 
such considerations as preference to allow presentation of all 
claims and defenses, any delay or unfairness in the parties 
conduct, the need for finality of judgments, and the respective 
hardships in denying or granting such relief. The court further 
stated at page 93 of Katz v. Prince, supra: 
That where there is doubt about whether a default should 
be set aside, that doubt should be resolved in favor of 
doing so. 
It appears from the Rules and Cases that Rule 60(b) 
U.R.C.P. applies only after a judgment has been entered and thus 
cannot be used until such time. If Rule 60(b) could have been 
used, as indicated in the Court's Memorandum Decision denying 
Defendants1 Objection to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Judgment (Record, p.333-335), and in the formal order of the 
court denying same (Record, p.386-389), prior to the date that the 
judgment was signed and entered, defendant would have proceeded 
accordingly, but until a judgment is signed and entered Rule 60(b) 
does not have meaning, otherwise defendants would have used it 
initially as suggested. 
(24) 
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